k.denisov
64c222a084
Runs OpenCode 2 with full permissions while containing its mistakes: - egress filter: squid in a container per project; squid.conf is rendered from layered egress.conf files (package, user, project, local) with allow/block/connect rules and expect-pass/expect-block self-tests - netlock: nftables rejects direct egress for the opencode-sandbox group (installed once with sudo as a systemd unit) - bubblewrap: read-only host, writable project, worktrees and state; credentials hidden; ssh keys via the host's ssh-agent; session bus replaced by an xdg-dbus-proxy limited to notifications; no permission prompts (sudo and systemd-run denied); refuses to run unsandboxed - per-project state in ~/.local/share/opencode-sandbox/<name> - worktrees: `wt add|rm|list` with project hooks - skills mounted per project; the opencode-sandbox skill explains the environment to the agent - plugins as submodules: context-panel, skill-compact-resurrect; global config adds opencode-notifier and cc-safety-net - README in English and Russian
11 lines
602 B
Markdown
11 lines
602 B
Markdown
# Environment: opencode-sandbox
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You run inside opencode-sandbox. Load the `opencode-sandbox` skill before working with the
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network, files outside the project, git remotes, Docker, or worktrees. In short:
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- You may write only to the project, its worktrees and paths listed in `OCSB_RW`; the rest of
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the system is read-only. "Read-only file system" is the sandbox, not a bug — do not retry.
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- Network goes through a filtering proxy. A 403 from the proxy is policy: tell the user which
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domain you need and why; do not try to bypass it.
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- You cannot open a browser; give the user the link instead.
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